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Penalty Default Interpretive Canons* 
Rebecca M. Kysar† 
INTRODUCTION 
A preference for a particular method of statutory 
interpretation over another often relates to one’s view of the 
legislative process. In advancing his textualist approach, for 
example, Justice Scalia relies in part on a conception that the 
legislative process, filled with self-serving representatives who 
plant misleading statements into the legislative record, 
malfunctions.1 Purposivists, on the other hand, share a more 
benign opinion of the legislative process—interpreting statutes 
in accordance with meritorious, public-regarding aims that 
were presumably sought by lawmakers in enacting the 
legislation in question. Neither understanding of the legislative 
process satisfies,2 and scholars continue to search for methods 
of statutory interpretation that reflect the actual functioning of 
the legislative process. 
A scholarly focus on whether a methodology of statutory 
interpretation is too cynical or too optimistic of the legislative 
process, however, is incomplete; in evaluating a methodology, 
scholarship must also explore how it affects the legislative 
process. Whether courts should remedy defects in the 
legislative process through the interpretive endeavor—or even 
whether they can—have been enduring questions in the 
  
 * © 2011 Rebecca M. Kysar. All rights reserved. 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. For extremely valuable 
comments, I am grateful to Kelly Dunbar, Anita Krishnakumar, Minor Myers, Larry 
Solan, and the participants of this symposium, as well as those of the 2011 panel for 
the AALS Section on Legislation and the Law of the Political Process. 
 1 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 34 (1997).  
 2 Even modern public-choice theory—a school of political science rooted in 
cynicism of representatives’ incentives—accepts a view of lawmakers that encompasses 
their pursuit of ideological preferences, in addition to campaign contributions and other 
rents. At times, however, the legal academy has not embraced such an expansive view 
of the theory. Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the 
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
66-68, 77 (1990). 
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academy,3 although one rarely visited in recent years. In this 
short essay, I conclude that such a curative function is indeed 
possible and desirable when Congress itself wishes it. 
Congress, for instance, has internal rules designed to cure 
collective-action problems yet often has no means of enforcing 
them, even when it so desires. I propose, however, that courts 
can sometimes aid Congress by assuming that those rules 
function correctly even when they do not. 
This interpretive approach falls within my novel 
categorization of several methodologies that contemplate a 
mismatch between reality and the view of the legislative 
process they assume. It is precisely this distorted view that 
eradicates identified problems in the legislative process. The 
problem I focus upon in this essay is that of “hidden” special-
interest provisions, the beneficiaries of which are not 
transparent to other lawmakers or in the statute’s plain 
language. More specifically, by assuming counterfactually that 
legislators actually disclose special-interest provisions, courts 
can create incentives for lawmakers to indeed do so.  
Collectively, I label these methodologies “penalty 
default interpretive canons”4 because they are analogous to the 
famous Ayres-Gertner thesis recommending that courts employ 
“penalty default” rules to specify outcomes that the contracting 
parties do not wish and, in turn, create incentives for the 
parties to reveal efficiency-enhancing information.5 Penalty 
default interpretive canons punish individual lawmakers who 
obscurely dole out special-interest benefits by refusing to give 
those deals effect. These canons accordingly motivate 
lawmakers to make special-interest benefits manifest—and 
  
 3 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 319 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest 
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); William D. Popkin, Foreword: Nonjudicial 
Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 315 (1990); Jane S. Schacter, 
Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-11 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 
YALE L.J. 1539, 1584-85 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 457 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting 
Statutes]; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
2071, 2114-15 (1990).  
 4 Two scholars have labeled their proposal, by which courts would hold 
unconstitutional “statutes whose incompleteness is designed to shift responsibility 
from the legislature onto other governmental branches,” as “the penalty default canon.” 
Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 663, 667 (2004). My labeling differs in that it applies to canons of statutory 
interpretation rather than constitutionality. 
 5 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).  
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thus subject to congressional and public scrutiny—during the 
legislative process. 
These canons generally do no interpretive harm when 
the legislative process accords with its assumed goal; that is, 
when it is clear that statutory provisions benefit certain special 
interests, the canons operate to bestow those benefits. Thus, 
penalty default interpretive canons may satisfy both cynics of 
and believers in the legislative process. By identifying such a 
category, this essay presents a more robust typology of theories 
and methods of statutory construction vis-à-vis the legislative 
process.  
This essay starts from the premise that hidden interest-
group deals are problematic—a foundational assumption supported 
by pluralist and republican theories alike.6 When one’s view of the 
legislative process’s proper aims expands from transparency in 
lawmaking, one will accept other interpretive methods as properly 
invoked—even when they rest upon unrealistic conjectures about 
the legislative process—so long as the conjecture is curative of the 
assumed “ills” that befall Congress.  
In Part I of this essay, I discuss typical critiques of two 
dominant interpretive methodologies—textualism and 
purposivism—that focus on their unrealistic depictions of the 
legislative process. In Part II, I then set forth the category of 
penalty default canons. Specifically, I discuss the several 
theories and methodologies that comprise this category and 
argue that their improbable account of the legislative process 
counterintuitively improves upon it. I also identify aspects of 
textualism and purposivism that may function as penalty 
default interpretive canons depending on one’s conception of 
the ideal legislative process. I conclude, however, that the 
subset of penalty default interpretive canons deriving from 
Congress’s own rules intrudes less on Congress’s lawmaking 
function than other interpretive canons and methodologies.  
I. THE TRADITIONAL TYPOLOGY 
One could argue that interpretive methodologies are 
improperly invoked when their underlying view of the 
  
 6 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory 
Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 575-78 (2009) (arguing that pluralists 
generally would not seek to enforce interest-group deals that are hidden from 
congressional members while republicans would generally prefer exposure of interest-
group deals to further deliberation).  
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legislative process deviates from that process’s actual 
functioning. I refer to this perspective as the “traditional” way 
of understanding statutory interpretation, and in this part, 
apply it to both textualism and purposivism.  
A. Textualism 
I begin with textualism. Textualists rely, in part, on 
hypothesized dysfunctions in the legislative process to justify 
rejecting a statute’s legislative history in favor of the statutory 
text. They argue, for example, that members of Congress do not 
use legislative history to enrich debate or to convince their 
colleagues of a statute’s proper meaning; instead, Congress uses 
legislative history strategically to influence later judicial 
constructions of the legislation. Owing to the massive increase in 
statutory proposals, textualists argue that legislators rarely 
even have the chance to read an act’s legislative history. For this 
reason, textualists insist that there are ample opportunities for 
legislators to inject a pet agenda into the legislative history 
without fear of retaliation from competing interests.7 In this 
manner, committee reports and floor statements do not record 
genuine legislative debate. And legislative materials thus do not 
reflect Congress’s actual intent.  
Moreover, it is a costly endeavor to cement interest-
group deals in the actual language of a statute—which must 
pass through the two houses of Congress and be signed by the 
President.8 The insertion of legislative-history language 
favorable to the interest group is a much cheaper deal to 
strike.9 Because committee members’ views are often in line 
with interest groups rather than their fellow lawmakers, this 
phenomenon may be quite prevalent.10 Textualists argue that 
  
 7 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. 
L. REV. 673, 686 nn.56-58 (1997) (citing sources concluding that members of Congress 
seldom see legislative history before casting their votes). But see William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 377 n.44 (1990) (citing 
studies that show legislators are more likely to read a committee report than a bill).  
 8 Thus, interest groups and lawmakers attempt to smuggle in their deals 
under the guise of public-interest legislation. Macey, supra note 3, at 232.  
 9 See Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 54-55 (1994) (“While the generation of supplementary 
legislative materials is costly, it is not nearly so costly as writing more specific statutes. 
In addition to the time and manpower necessary to produce the statutory language, it 
must be agreed upon by the Congress, a process that becomes more precarious as 
legislation becomes more specific.”). 
 10 Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive 
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (“Committee membership rarely 
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judicial consultation of legislative history increases the 
likelihood that these hidden deals will be enforced—thus 
making them more valuable and prevalent.11 In light of these 
features of the legislative process, textualists firmly believe 
that the surest guide to the legislature’s intent is the actual 
text of the statute voted upon by members of Congress.  
Finally, some textualists rely on insights from public-
choice theory that indicate the legislative process’s inability to 
aggregate lawmakers’ individual preferences into a single 
collective choice, a contention made famous by Kenneth Arrow.12 
One could describe this phenomenon as another dysfunction of 
the legislative process. Taking these dysfunctions together, 
although the Court lacks a textualist majority, it “now seems to 
accept that the uncertainties of the legislative process make it 
safer simply to respect the language that Congress selects, at 
least when that language is clear in context.”13 
To be sure, textualism, as a comprehensive theory of 
statutory interpretation, relies on more than an assumption of 
the “dysfunctional” legislative process; it also assumes that the 
statute’s words rather than legislative intent govern from a 
constitutional perspective and that judges simply lack the 
institutional capability to make sense of the fragments of 
statutory meaning embedded in the legislative record.14 But 
imagine a judge who is committed to textualism solely because 
she views the legislative process as dysfunctional. She will be 
employing a correct methodology when her assumption 
matches reality—for example, when she ignores a member’s 
statement in the Congressional Record that favored an 
interest-group position but was not accepted by his colleagues. 
  
represents a cross-section of the legislature. Instead, legislators tend to self-select into 
those committees in which their supporters have the greatest stakes.”). 
 11 Manning, supra note 7, at 688 (“‘[T]o the degree that judges are perceived 
as grasping at any fragment of legislative history for insights into congressional intent, 
to that degree will legislators be encouraged to salt the legislative record with 
unilateral interpretations of statutory provisions they were unable to persuade their 
colleagues to accept.’”) (quoting Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 
F.2d 697, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring)); see also, e.g., Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568, 570 (2005) (recognizing that, in some 
circumstances, “unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected 
staffers and lobbyists” manipulate legislative history to obtain results that they could 
not achieve on the face of the statute).  
 12 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) 
(citing Arrow’s paradox, which posits that the order in which decisions are made—
rather than majority preferences—dictates the outcome of majority voting).  
 13 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2419 (2003). 
 14 SCALIA, supra note 1, at 29-37.  
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When her assumption does not match reality, however, she will 
overlook potentially valuable insight into congressional intent. 
Perhaps, for instance, lawmakers voted for the statute with full 
knowledge that the legislative history would be used as a gap-
filling device.15 The difficulty for the judge, of course, is 
distinguishing between these two scenarios—a nearly 
impossible task. Inevitably, then, judges at times will invoke 
textualism improperly, depending on their own interpretive 
theory.16 
B. Purposivism 
The second theoretical approach to statutory 
interpretation that I will address is purposivism. Purposivism 
instructs courts to interpret statutes in a manner that will best 
effectuate the statute’s purpose. This approach was made 
dominant by the legal-process school, founded by Henry Hart 
and Albert Sacks. Hart and Sacks argued that “every statute 
must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act” because 
“a statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea 
of law and inadmissible.”17 To determine the statute’s purpose, 
Hart and Sacks prescribed three assumptions the judge must 
make: (1) statutes are the work of reasonable lawmakers 
pursuing reasonable purposes; (2) the statute must not be read 
to mandate irrational patterns of outcomes; and (3) what 
constitutes an irrational pattern of outcomes must be “judged 
in the light of the overriding and organizing purpose.”18 
One might argue that purposivism rests upon a rosy 
view of the legislative process: there is no consensus among 
lawmakers on a statute’s rational purpose, lawmakers are not 
rational, and/or there is no enacted logical purpose.19 To the 
  
 15 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, 
Interpretation, and the Rule of Law, in NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 265, 273 (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 1994) (discussing the influence of rules of construction on legislative 
behavior). 
 16 Some textualists would, of course, have responses to this conundrum that 
do not rely on dysfunctions in the legislative process. For instance, Scalia would surely 
respond that judges should keep to the text of the statute precisely because they are 
institutionally ill-equipped to weed out genuine from strategic legislative history.  
 17 See generally HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1124-25 (William Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994).  
 18 Id. 
 19 On the other hand, it may be that Hart and Sacks thought of their theory 
as primarily normative rather than descriptive. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES 
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extent purposivists rely on an optimistic view of the legislative 
process, they also seem to suffer from the critique that their 
methodologies are improperly invoked when the legislative 
process does not function in accordance with this view. 
Consider a judge who finds an intelligible purpose behind a 
statute and applies it to a set of facts because she assumes the 
legislative process produces that purpose. The judge will be 
invoking a correct methodology if her hypothesis bears true. 
But when her assumption does not match reality, the judge 
may be imputing a purpose never contemplated by Congress.20 
II. PENALTY DEFAULT INTERPRETIVE CANONS: A NEW 
TYPOLOGY 
So far, we have seen interpretive methodologies that are 
arguably improperly invoked when there is a mismatch 
between assumptions about the legislative process and its 
actual functioning. In this part, I argue that this categorization 
is too narrow—that methodologies sometimes utilize the 
tension between their underlying assumptions and reality to 
further the functionality of the legislative process.  
In the 1980s, legal scholars began to suggest 
interpretive methods to combat both the oversupply of private-
regarding legislation and an undersupply of public-regarding 
legislation. This distortion, according to public-choice theory, 
occurs because special interests seek rents from lawmakers at 
the expense of a disinterested public. To combat this perceived 
inefficiency, some scholars have argued that courts should 
interpret statutes narrowly against interest groups.21 Critics 
maintain that this approach demands that judges exceed their 
  
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 750 
(4th ed. 2007).  
 20 Of course, some purposivists would argue that, even where there is no 
ascertainable purpose, a judge should impart one to develop an organized, principled 
statutory regime. This alternative view demonstrates that errors produced by a 
particular interpretive methodology will appear or disappear depending on one’s ideal 
view of the legislative process and the courts’ role in effectuating that view, which I 
discuss below. 
 21 Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 3, at 486-87; see also Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: The Court and the Economic 
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (1984) (suggesting that courts should narrowly 
interpret statutes that transfer rents to special interests); Carlos E. Gonzalez, 
Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 663-64 (1996) (arguing 
that courts must interpret legislation “along public-regarding lines”); cf. Jerry L. 
Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 123, 134-35 (1989) (predicting that judges who embrace public-choice 
theory will construe legislation against special-interest groups).  
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interpretive role because public-choice theory does not indicate 
the appropriate level of interest-group influence.22 Arguably, 
these methods are objectionable when the political process 
produces an acceptable level of interest-group activity.  
Other interpretive methods, however, simply combat 
“hidden” interest-group deals and therefore do not as readily 
shift power to the judiciary in an objectionable way. In short, 
these methods direct the judge to elevate or ignore certain 
aspects of the political process in the hierarchy of 
interpretative aids. Jonathan Macey has argued that 
interpreting statutes according to their stated purpose will 
limit interest-group activity.23 To justify this approach, Macey 
contends that interest groups and lawmakers hide their deals 
in “hidden-implicit” statutes because “open-explicit” statutes 
are more politically costly. By refusing to uncover deals in 
hidden-implicit statutes, judges following Macey’s approach 
can create incentives for more transparent legislation. Richard 
Posner similarly seeks to limit hidden interest-group deals by 
simply ignoring them, although he rejects purposivism 
precisely because public-choice theory predicts fewer statutes 
with public-regarding purposes.24 In Posner’s view, judges 
should not conjecture about interest-group activity that is not 
publicly available.25  
Both Macey’s and Posner’s approaches rest on the 
relatively noncontroversial premise that interest-group activity 
should be exposed, as opposed to the more controversial 
premise that it should be limited.26 To effectuate this goal, both 
approaches also rely on a counterfactual vision of the 
  
 22 See Elhauge, supra note 10, at 34 (“[A]ny defects in the political process 
identified by interest group theory depend on implicit normative baselines and thus do 
not stand independent of substantive conclusions about the merits of particular 
political outcomes. Accordingly, expansions of judicial review cannot meaningfully be 
limited by requiring threshold findings of excessive interest group influence. Further, 
the use of interest group theory to condemn the political process reflects normative 
views that are contestable and may not reflect the views of the polity.”). 
 23 Macey, supra note 3, at 227, 238, 250-56. 
 24 RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985). 
 25 Richard Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 286 (1982). In pairing different interpretive 
techniques with different classes of statutes, William Eskridge essentially adopts this 
approach for statutes with concentrated benefits and distributed costs. William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for 
Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 296-97 (1988).  
 26 Elhauge, supra note 10, at 45 n.72 (carving out from his critique of public-
choice-driven interpretive theories those theories that “rel[y] only on the proposition that 
such interpretation alleviates the information cost problems of politics by forcing interest 
groups and politicians to publicize any nefarious purpose a ‘captured’ statute has”). 
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legislative process. By assuming that the publicly stated 
purpose on the face of legislation is correct or by ignoring 
nonpublic evidence of interest-group deals, judges counter 
hidden special-interest legislation.  
Elsewhere, I have recommended a statutory 
interpretation methodology that also possesses these 
characteristics. My proposal increases the costs of hidden-
implicit special-interest deals by assuming—at times 
counterfactually—that the legislature discloses certain special-
interest earmarks in accordance with its own legislative rules.27 
This proposal is perhaps less controversial than Macey’s or 
Posner’s because it assists the legislature in curing the ills it 
perceives of itself. Otherwise, the legislative rules are 
effectively unenforceable, either through litigation28 or within 
Congress itself.29 Although the methodology assumes the 
functionality of the legislative process, it is appropriately 
invoked even when reality differs—that is, unless one does not 
support the goal of unearthing hidden interest-group deals. 
Additionally, when the legislature abides by its own rules and 
discloses special-interest legislation accordingly, the 
methodology upholds those deals.  
Courts have also developed penalty default interpretive 
canons. In attempts to reduce logrolling and nontransparent 
lawmaking, the U.S. House and Senate have internal rules 
that typically forbid members from adding riders to 
appropriations bills without deliberation in the ordinary 
committee process. Although these rules are routinely ignored 
or waived,30 courts effectively bolster them by employing an 
interpretive canon that presumes the legislature does not 
substantively amend through appropriations measures, even 
though this legislative practice often occurs.  
Perhaps the leading case in this area is Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill (TVA), where the Court held that the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 prohibited completion of a dam 
  
 27 Kysar, supra note 6, at 562-67.  
 28 Courts have ruled that legislative rules are nonjusticiable under the 
Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution, except in a few rare cases involving other 
constitutional rights or clauses. Id. at 560-61; see also Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting 
Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1021-25 (2011).  
 29 The purpose of the rules, after all, is to require congressional members to 
disclose “earmarks” that would otherwise remain hidden. Enforcement by fellow 
congressional members would be paradoxical, then, since it would require identifying 
hidden earmarks. 
 30 Sandra Beth Zellman, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of 
Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 506 (1997). 
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that would threaten the existence of a rare fish.31 The Court 
concluded that continued appropriations for the project did not 
repeal substantive law, reasoning that an opposite holding 
would “[n]ot only . . . lead to the absurd result of requiring 
Members to review exhaustively the background of every 
authorization before voting on an appropriation, but it would 
flout the very rules the Congress carefully adopted to avoid this 
need.”32 The Court then cited an internal House rule that 
provided a point of order against substantive amendments in 
appropriations.33 This approach is similar to my own in that it 
assists the legislature in enforcing rules intended to address 
problems Congress sees of itself—the tendency to engage in 
legislative subterfuge rather than deliberation. It also 
implicitly recognizes Congress’s inability to police rules that 
combat legislative subterfuge.  
Similarly, the so-called elephant-in-mousehole doctrine, 
applied by the Supreme Court34 and the courts of appeals,35 
holds that “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details 
of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—
it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”36 The 
elephant-in-mousehole doctrine has its origins in FDA v. Brown 
  
 31 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978). 
 32 Id. at 190-91. 
 33 Id. at 191.  
 34 The Court employed the canon again in Gonzales v. Oregon, when it held 
that the attorney general did not have authority under the Controlled Substance Act to 
prohibit physicians from prescribing drugs for use in assisted suicides. The Court 
rejected “[t]he idea that Congress gave the Attorney General such broad and unusual 
authority through an implicit delegation in the CSA’s registration provision.” 546 U.S. 
243, 267 (2006) (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Co., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)). 
 35 Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Gates, 486 F.3d 1316, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(citing the elephant-in-mousehole doctrine in holding that the Department of Defense 
did not have authority under the National Defense Authorization Act to curtail civilian 
employees’ collective-bargaining rights); Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (holding that Congress did not grant the Federal Trade Commission 
authority to regulate attorneys under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act because to hold 
otherwise would require the conclusion “that Congress not only had hidden a rather 
large elephant in a rather obscure mousehole, but had buried the ambiguity in which 
the pachyderm lurks beneath an incredibly deep mound of specificity”); NISH v. 
Rumsfeld, 348 F.3d 1263, 1269 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We simply do not see the elephant in 
the mousehole” where the military claimed that the Randolph-Sheppard Act gave blind 
vendors priority in awarding mess hall contracts.).  
 36 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468. But see Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 
578, 592 (1980) (“[I]t would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would 
require Congress to state in committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that 
which is obvious on the face of a statute. In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a 
court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did 
not bark.”).  
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& Williamson Tobacco Corp., where the Supreme Court held 
that nicotine was not regulated by the FDA because it did not 
constitute a drug under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act. Although nicotine arguably fell within the statute’s broad 
definition of “drug,” the Court held that “Congress could not 
have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and 
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”37  
Related to this approach is the “dog-doesn’t-bark” canon. 
Under this canon, if a statutory interpretation would 
significantly change the existing legal landscape, a lack of 
congressional debate on the issue is evidence that Congress did 
not intend that interpretation.38 These two canons are striking 
in that they defy the insights of public-choice theory—that 
interest groups and lawmakers sometimes employ vague terms 
or ancillary provisions (or, to use Macey’s language, hidden-
implicit statutes) to convey important benefits. When hidden-
implicit deals occur, these canons work to deny such benefits.  
To be sure, the elephant-in-mousehole doctrine and the 
dog-doesn’t-bark canon sometimes—if not the majority of 
times—simply fulfill congressional intent, as was most likely 
the case in FDA v. Brown. In these instances, the canons will 
accurately reflect congressional intent by refusing to alter the 
legal scheme based on innocuous provisions (rather than by 
thwarting a hidden legislative agenda). Still, when members of 
Congress deploy obscure lawmaking techniques to reward 
interest groups, these canons will frustrate that effort. These 
two canons, then, along with the presumption against 
substantive lawmaking through appropriations riders, appear 
to function—or have the potential to function—as penalty 
default interpretive canons. They require the judiciary to 
assume the legislative process is working correctly (i.e., 
lawmakers are not engaging in legislative subterfuge) even 
  
 37 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).  
 38 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90 (2007) 
(holding that New Mexico’s local-aid program qualified as “equalized expenditures” 
under the Federal Impact Aid Program since, at the time of its enactment, legislative 
history indicated no intention to alter the Department of Education’s method of 
calculating expenditures); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (rejecting a 
particular statutory construction because, in light of extensive legislative history, 
“Congress’ silence [on the matter] . . . can be likened to the dog that did not bark”); 
Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981) (opinion 
withdrawn based on enactment of new statute) (concluding that the Alaska Lands Act 
did not apply to non-Alaska land, despite rather clear statutory text to the contrary, 
because the legislative history did not indicate “a change in current laws of access of 
the magnitude of the . . . proposed interpretation”).  
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when it malfunctions—resulting in a refusal to convey hidden 
special-interest-group benefits.  
This exploration of penalty default interpretive canons 
generates a rethinking of the errors produced by two of the 
archetypal schools of interpretive theory—textualism and 
purposivism—which can also be employed as penalty default 
interpretive canons. Indeed, Macey’s proposal identifies 
purposivism as the means to achieve transparent legislation—
holding the legislature to its stated public-regarding purpose, no 
matter its disingenuousness.39 Similarly, textualism, by ignoring 
legislative history despite congressional practice to bury low-cost 
interest-group deals precisely there, incentivizes legislatures to 
elevate special-interest deals to the text of the statute. 
Of course, the range of errors produced by these theories 
will be minimized or maximized as one accepts more or fewer 
types of legislative dysfunctions as proper targets of judicial 
incentives. For instance, if one agrees that interest-group 
activity should be curtailed, one may not be troubled by a court 
casting a public-regarding gloss to a statute, even though the 
legislature intended no such purpose.  
A second-order question arises, however, after one 
accepts that an occurrence in the legislative process is 
problematic: whether and to what extent the judiciary should 
suppress it. My own view, as I have explored elsewhere, is that 
canons assuming the correct functioning of rules that the 
legislature sets for itself are less vulnerable to the attack that 
the judiciary has exceeded its interpretive function.40 My 
approach to the earmark-disclosure rules and the approach 
articulated by the TVA Court fall within this subcategory of 
penalty default interpretive canons. Legislative rules can be 
thought of as indications of congressional intent regarding the 
process and content of lawmaking. Recognizing both the 
congressional willingness to abide by these rules and the 
collective-action problems in doing so, these interpretive 
methodologies may assist the legislature in achieving its goal of 
enacting legislation in accordance with its rules, even when 
individual defections from those rules occur.  
  
 39 See Macey, supra note 3. 
 40 See Kysar, supra note 6, at 568-78 (citing support for the proposal in 
accordance with precedent, separation-of-powers theory, textualism, intentionalism, 
republicanism, and pluralism). These canons should not apply, however, when the 
legislature has collectively waived the rules.  
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As to my proposal, one might argue that a court’s 
bestowal of special-interest benefits when Congress has not, by 
its own rules, disclosed them presents greater separation-of-
powers concerns. Indeed, because of those concerns, courts 
routinely assume that Congress has followed its own rules in 
other contexts.41 This proposal thus dovetails with this case law 
by refusing to question Congress’s internal rules of procedure 
in accordance with its rulemaking authority granted by the 
Constitution.42 In so doing, it recognizes that there is indeed no 
legislative bargain when Congress’s own bargaining rules are 
not met.  
CONCLUSION 
This essay starts from the premise that hidden interest-
group deals in the legislative process should be discouraged. 
This assumption is useful for identifying penalty default 
interpretive canons as tools to discourage those deals. It also 
effectuates the primary goal of this essay—to discard the view 
that an interpretive theory is improperly invoked when it 
paints an unrealistic picture of the legislative process. The 
scope and occurrence of such interpretive errors will, of course, 
depend on one’s theory of the legislative process and the role of 
the judiciary. I therefore do not seek to definitively answer the 
question posed by this symposium, “How much work does 
language do?” But I hope to reframe our view, as statutory 
interpretation scholars, of the interaction between judicial 
construction of statutory language and the legislative process. 
  
 41 See, e.g., Metzenbaum v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 675 F.2d 1282, 
1288 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that the question of whether Congress has followed its own 
rules is nonjusticiable and thus courts, out of “deference,” must assume that Congress 
acted in accordance with its rules); see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 
672 (1892) (refusing to question the presiding officer’s certification that a bill presented to 
and signed by the President was the same as the one enacted by the House).  
 42 The Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution states that “Each House may 
determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2. Courts interpret this 
Clause to stand for the proposition that legislative rules are beyond judicial review. See 
John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to 
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1790-92 (2003). 
